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Abstract
This chapter addresses the problem of building normative multi-agent systems in terms of regulat-
ory mechanisms. It describes a static conceptual model through which one can specify normative
multi-agent systems along with a dynamic model to capture their operation and evolution. The
chapter proposes a typology of applications and presents some open problems. In the last section,
the authors express their individual views on these matters.
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1 Introduction
Central to the idea of a normative multi-agent systems is the important distinction between
regimentation and regulation, first drawn in the present technical setting by Jones and Sergot
[42]. The key distinction is that regimentation arises in a system that forces or precludes
certain actions whereas regulation arises in a system that neither forces nor precludes the
relevant actions but merely regulates the participants so that those actions respectively occur
or fail to occur. Specifically, when we think of multi-agent systems—which by definition
consist of multiple agents—subject to various constraints, regimentation becomes ensuring
the agents are simply (i.e., “physically”) unable to violate some constraints whereas regulation
becomes ensuring the agents choose not to violate the constraints, despite being able to
violate them.
In other words, the notion of regulation is central to the idea of autonomy and thus
legitimises the general idea of norms as we understand them. For if an agent were simply
unable to violate a constraint, the constraint would appear less like a norm and more like a
physical law, such as that of the conservation of energy.
A note on terminology: for our present purposes, we treat a regulation as a norm that is
of social provenance and applies on the interactions of the participants. In this manner, we
would not include within regulations the following kinds of norms: personal norms (never
mislead my friends) and social conventions (greet everyone at the start of a meeting).
Regulation as the idea of control despite autonomy involves the obvious idea of a life cycle
of regulations being promulgated, obeyed (or disobeyed), enforced, updated, and revoked. The
notion of regulations presumes what we term a normative architecture or a social backdrop.
The notion of regulations, however, is more general than any such normative architecture in
which they may exist—regulations can exist in any setting where multi-agent systems make
sense. Specifically, we can see regulations being applied in a setting involving a designated
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governor [54] for each agent, just as much as in a setting involving social control. And,
regulations can be promulgated by a central authority just as much as being democratically
decided. Our emphasis, as multi-agent systems researchers, falls on normative architectures
that respect the autonomy of the participants and carry a conceptually decentralised flavour.
Even such architectures may be realised in systems wherein the participants elect a governor
who either enforces the regulations they jointly promulgate or promulgates and enforces
regulations on its own initiative. It is not surprising that many computational architectures
reflect one of the cases where a governor is either elected or appointed, even if the remaining
participants might be notionally peers of each other.
1.1 Example
To motivate this discussion further, let us consider the example setting of traditional commerce.
Commerce clearly involves autonomous parties: buyers and sellers at the very least and often
members of an extensive ecosystem of suppliers, shippers, payment processors, and ratings
agencies. Since the parties are autonomous, regimentation is out of the question: you cannot
prevent a seller from selling illegal goods or from failing to ship goods that the buyer has
paid for nor the buyer from refusing to pay for goods ordered. But regulation is essential.
The buyer and seller can regulate their transaction to some extent by entering into a contract
that specifies the transaction. Or, they may adopt the regulations in place in their social
environment, such as the city or marketplace where they operate. In either case, in general,
each party would rely upon another entity to help enforce a regulation when its interests are
at stake in the satisfaction of the regulation. This entity could be a government agency, an
industry board, or a nominated third-party that the participants agree upon. Although the
parties may also function without such an entity to back the regulations, such a situation
becomes rarer as the stakes go up.
Now what would change if we move to electronic commerce? Clearly, the same or similar
roles are still involved. It is obvious that there is an equal need for regulation in virtual
settings as well. E-commerce is usually facilitated through marketplaces such as eBay
wherein the buyers and sellers can meet to conduct business. The marketplace serves as
a promulgator and enforcer of regulations. Thus the most common form of e-commerce
employs a centralised architecture. In the days of Usenet prior to the Web, it was common
for users to find each other and conduct transactions without a formal marketplace. This is
analogous to transactions where the parties find each other through Craigslist today. Such
transactions might involve one party sending a payment to another to purchase the specified
goods. In such settings, too, regulations apply though there is no ready means to enforce
them. Potentially, in some countries such as in the US and Europe, the government can get
involved if broader regulations against fraud in commerce appear to be violated.
Let us imagine that we have a virtual marketplace. Clearly the entities that live in such
a marketplace are not people but their software agents. This leads to the question of to
whom do the regulations apply: the agents or the people? An important idea here is one
of responsibility and accountability, for example, as delineated by Mamdani and Pitt [50].
One can imagine a virtual world populated by software agents where each agent acts on
its own behalf and is therefore subject to the virtual world’s regulations. But in the more
common uses of agents, especially in settings such as commerce that involve an external
reality, the agents are merely representatives of people. The agents could be intelligent
and function without minor guidance but insofar as they are representatives of people, the
regulations apply to people, who must bear the consequences of obeying or disobeying them.
The situation is analogous to a business owner using an accountant to prepare a government
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filing. It is the business owner who is subject to government regulations and would bear the
consequences of complying or not, unless the accountant has violated regulations pertaining
to the field of accountancy.
Restricted in this manner, we view each agent as representing a principal. The compu-
tational system, such as the marketplace above, facilitates interactions among the agents
by supporting the necessary bookkeeping but does not have a life of its own. That is,
the computational system is merely an instrument. The life belongs to the participants,
including the principal whom the marketplace viewed as an agent represents. Actions in
the computational systems count as actions in the real world where they are subject to
appropriate regulations.
1.2 Layout of the Chapter
The main objective of this chapter is to formulate the research challenges of regulated MAS.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 takes a closer look at some
typical applications of regulated MAS. Section 3 provides a deeper motivation of normative
architectures wherein regulations are feasible, discussing the common traits of normative
architectures. Section 4 describes the main components of a conceptual model for regulations.
Section 5 introduces how such a conceptual model can be operationalised in the above
architectures. Section 6 discusses some dynamic aspects of regulations, especially how they
evolve over time. Section 7 relates regulated MAS with other perspectives in computer
science, with an emphasis on the software engineering of sociotechnical systems. Section 8
illustrates a real-life example of a regulated MAS drawn from the domain of open innovation.
Section 9 summarises some open research problems pertaining to regulated MAS. Section 10
provides a soapbox for each of the authors to describe their personal views.
2 Normative Applications
Regulated MAS serve one main function, to set a “level playing ground” (as D. North [55]
postulates for institutions). Putting it bluntly, regulated MAS create an institutional reality
that is different from the physical reality. In the institutional reality, only institutional
facts and actions exist. As we discuss in the next section, these two realities have some
correspondence thanks to the “constitutive” norms. Those norms produce, on one hand,
the legitimacy of the regulated MAS to create an institutional reality that is governed by
regulations and to enforce these on participants and, on the other hand, the entitlements
needed by agents to act within that institutional reality and consequently held liable in the
actual world. In addition, those constitutive norms also determine the ontology that will exist
in the institutional reality and the counts-as relationship that establishes a correspondence
between facts and actions in the physical world, and institutional facts and actions (see
Searle [62]). The ultimate purpose of a regulated MAS is to articulate interactions where
several autonomous agents may be involved. By fixing ontology and regulating admissible
and legal actions, the regulated MAS reduces uncertainty and simplifies decision-making
“surrounding agents with reliable and perceivable patterns of events that allow them to make
reasonable and stable calculations about behaviour” [65, p. 78]. Furthermore, governance, by
providing some degree of control over undesired behaviour, serves to allocate risk and limit
the exposure and liability of agents.
A regulated MAS is supposed to be implemented properly (with respect to the three
integrity challenges discussed on Page 99), and to make the aforementioned institutional
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reality work. The implementation also needs to support five components that are essential
for that normative architecture we mentioned above:
A “virtual space” where agents may interact.
A “shared ontology” to which all agents may univocally refer to.
An “interaction model” that determines what the primitive or atomic agent actions are
and how they may be interlaced into activities involving many agents.
A “set of regulations” that affect agent interactions. In addition a collection of norms
of different sorts, this set may contain an explicit mention to regimented constraints
and may also include (meta)norms that regulate how existing norms may be modified or
revoked and how new norms may be introduced in the set.
A “governance model” which consists of two complementary elements. First, some prin-
ciples about compliance (i.e., constraints—within the regulated MAS—whose enforcement
is regimented, norms whose enforcement is discretional—in the sense that the sanctions
may be imposed or not depending on the judgement of the enforcers—and yet another
type of norms whose application is not discretional). Second, enforcement mechanisms
that contend with violations; that is, how infractions are ascertained and then dealt with
(e.g., a centralised mechanism, some law enforcement agents, self-regulated peer-to-peer
control).
What are the conditions that make a regulated MAS useful in practice? There is a
threefold answer:
First, when the agents whose participation is regulated have the following features:
(i) they are autonomous towards observance of norms (ii) their internal decision-making and
motivation is beyond the control of the regulated MAS, (iii) the agents may be malicious
or incompetent and thus are likely to infringe norms, (iv) may “enter or leave” (be active
in) the virtual space at will, (v) are independent from each other or do not represent the
same principal and thus may have different and perhaps conflicting individual goals, and
(vi) there is some liability in their actions.
Second, when the situations where these agents meet have the following features: (i) reg-
ulated activities are repetitive (no need to regulate one-shot situations), (ii) activities are
performed in a shared social context (at any point in time several individuals share the same
state of the world, the same regulations apply to all and any institutional action by any of
them affects the shared state of the world) (iii) regulated interactions are perceivable and
applicable conventions are ostensible.
Third, the regulated MAS is backed by an organisation and supported by technological
artifacts that resolve the “integrity challenges” that are discussed in Section 5. Namely:
(i) create the stable interaction environment and maintain it in proper operation, (ii) manage
access and “identity” of participating agents, (iii) implement the governance model, (iv) assure
the persistence and enforcement of regimented constraints as well as the sound management
of regulations.
2.1 Towards a typology of regulated MAS applications
Since the notion of a normative MAS is recent and few multi-agent system approaches
include normative aspects explicitly as part of their conceptual framework there are not
many examples of actual regulated MAS applications. Nevertheless, the examples reported
in the last chapter of this book provide a suggestive indication of the types of applications of
regulated MAS that are being or will be developed. Other examples of applications, which
may qualify as regulated MAS in the sense just described, may be drawn from a number
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of “standard” MAS that have been developed from an organisational or an institutional
standpoint. Additionally, some conventional systems and even some multi-agent systems
that organise social or collective activities may be reified as regulated MAS, even if the
actual normative component in some of these maybe flimsy. Note, however, that for all these
examples, the provisos stated in Section 7 should be kept in mind.
A look at those three sources of examples allows us to venture four distinct types of
applications that involve agents, situations and organisational functionalities for which
regulated MAS are appropriate.
Hard-wired sociotechnical systems. Systems where the conventions that regulate agent
interactions are established at design time and are issued and maintained by the owner
of the system [69]. Although many of these conventions are hard-wired into mostly static
workflows in a regimented way, there may also be some norms that might be violated
and need enforcement and regulations may evolve over time. The balance between
regimentation and enforceability (and the corresponding enforcement mechanisms as
well as the dynamics of the regulations) respond to pragmatic aspects like efficiency,
ease of use, accountability, trust-worthiness, risk, and liability. Typical examples are
e-markets (for on-line sales, e.g., eBay and PayPal), enterprise information systems (for
hospital management, hotels) and web-based conventional social activities (for example,
e-government transactions, e-learning or some forms of mobile health care).
Agent-reified conventional regulated environments. This type includes social conventional
or traditional activities that are subject to norms, but are now web-enabled in some way
and involve agents that perform regulatory functions; for example, collective writing in
Wikipedia. Some of these sociotechnical systems may be properly labeled regulated MAS.
Examples of these type in Chapter 7 of this book are the one about norms in open source
software repositories by Savarimuthu and Dam; the one by Villata and Gandon, on data
licensing in the web; and the one by Fornara and Eynard on data collection.
Artificial social systems. Two distinct breeds: (i) Those systems used for modelling and
simulation in fields like experimental economics, sociology or policy-making; for example,
the UAV (unmanned autonomous vehicles) example by Governatori and Lam, and the
water management policy simulator example by Noriega (both in Ch. 7) and (ii) Virtual
worlds, for immersive remote interactions, like the ones discussed by Cranefield and
Verhagen (in Ch. 7); and virtual worlds as those used in games, like those discussed by
Dignum (also in Ch. 7). In both types of applications, the advantage of a regulated MAS
is that design concerns about agents and the environment are clearly separated; the use of
explicit formal norms allows for a more abstract and flexible specification of conventions,
scenarios and performance indicators, and in addition these may support to some extent
off-line and on-line reasoning by designers and agents.
Open sociotechnical ecosystems. In these systems a regulated MAS furnishes the normat-
ive architecture that enables the inception and runtime support of new organisations,
agreements or collective activities that are subject to their own regulations and may be
created by centralised off-line design or by on-line peer-to-peer collaboration of particip-
ating agents. Examples of these systems are the virtual enterprises scenario proposed in
[45], the Ocean Observatory Initiative (OOI) reported by Singh et al. in Chapter 7 of
this book and the Green Open Innovation Platform described below in Section 8.
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Figure 1 The relationships between the parts of a sociotechnical system.
3 Normative Architecture
The foregoing sections made the case for regulated MAS as involving agents who represent
principals. Let us now consider the architecture of a regulated MAS, which we dub the
normative architecture, in conceptual terms. The agents function as autonomous with respect
to other agents but they derive their autonomy from the principals they represent, thereby
making the principals accountable for their actions. In this manner, regulations make the
most sense in settings that combine the social and the technical spheres. In this regard, we
can treat regulated MAS as sociotechnical systems [69]. Sometimes this term is used for
systems that merely involve human interaction with a computer; here, we specifically mean
interactions between socially autonomous entities, such as people and organisations, though
the interactions involve and are mediated through technical artefacts such as computers.
Figure 1 describes how a regulated MAS may be understood. At one side is the world,
which we can think of approximately as the “physical” world. More carefully, it represents
the objective reality for the purposes of modelling. For example, in commerce, the world
provides a home for the goods being bought and sold as well as the infrastructure such as for
shipping and paying that commerce needs. In a multi-user virtual environment, the world
may simply be the virtual reality in which avatars of the users exist and function.
At the other side lie the technical artefacts. For our purposes, these are computational
representations of the world as well as means (programs) to manipulate them. We can resolve
the distinction between representation and reality simply in terms of how we choose to model.
Whatever is endogenous falls into the technical artefacts and whatever is exogenous falls into
the world. For example, although physical goods, vehicles, currency are clearly the province of
the world, we might treat the services that deal with such objects as internal or endogenous. A
key distinction is that whatever is endogenous can be manipulated computationally from the
model and vice versa. Referring back to Section 1, the endogenous parts can be regimented
(the bank account is never overdrawn) but what is exogenous can only be regulated (the
customer shouldn’t write a check for more money than he has in his account) [69].
At the top, we place the regulated MAS itself, which exists in the world and is realised
through the technical artefacts. The whole idea of commerce, for example, resides at this
level. People may pass objects back and forth but only in some suitable settings can such





Figure 2 A sociotechnical system schematically.
actions count as [62] a commercial transaction. In particular, these settings involve the
satisfaction of various norms, and impose regulations upon the transaction—for example,
that goods can only be sold by someone who has ownership of them (not just possession)
and a successful transaction results in a change of ownership.
The above characterises a regulated MAS in conceptual terms. How can we realise
such a system? Figure 2 describes a sociotechnical system in schematic terms. We view
such a system as having three main parts. The sociotechnical system is grounded in the
physical world, inhabited by exogenous resources such as vehicles (autonomous or otherwise).
Overlaid on the physical world is the technical (i.e., computational) structure, inhabited by
information resources such as databases. Normative reality, home to the regulations, exists
over the physical world and technical artifacts. In this manner, social interactions—that is,
those subject to regulations—may be realised in the physical world through the mediation as
needed of the technical artifacts.
The main conceptual challenge in regulated MAS is to maintain their integrity if only to
ensure that regulations are being obeyed or to find out whether they are being disobeyed and
by whom. Ensuring integrity in a sociotechnical system is nontrivial. Since a sociotechnical
system brings together three concerns in its modelling, it is important to recognise that
each of them may potentially be the cause of an integrity violation. First is the challenge
in ensuring that the regulated MAS itself is sound: that is, the regulations do not conflict
with each other and are potentially jointly achievable in principle. Chapter 2 addresses these
formal challenges.
Second is the challenge of ensuring that the technical artefacts are correct. Let us put
aside implementation-level concerns, such as that the sorting routine being used is correct,
which we can capture in terms of the underlying infrastructure. The main conceptual aspect
of integrity of the artefacts comes down to what is termed identity in computing parlance
[20] but better corresponds to an ability to identify relevant objects. Identification is a
crucial function of sociotechnical systems. Not surprisingly, the ability to identify principals
is crucial for accountability: if we don’t know who’s who, we have no legitimate basis for
determining if a regulation is being obeyed or disobeyed. The ability to identify technical
artefacts is equally as crucial because it enables tracing actions to their principals and thus
potentially determining who was responsible for obeying or disobeying a regulation. In
traditional human societies, for example, a small village, each party would be known to every
other party. In larger human societies, identification becomes difficult. In modern settings,
the government, which plays the “governor” role alluded to in Section 1, additionally provides
a means to identify the participants. Likewise, in virtual settings such as eBay, the resident
authority (think of it as the governor of the eBay marketplace) provides the identification.
The provisioning of identification is a common feature of regulated settings. An ability
to identify a participant is a prerequisite for regulating its interactions. Identifiability can
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be achieved definitionally at the regulated MAS level. It can be trivially implemented at
the technical level: simply give everyone an account with which they must login before
participating in the sociotechnical system. Achieving identifiability at the physical level is
nontrivial and the challenge segues into the one below.
Third is the challenge in ensuring that the physical world, which recall provides the
infrastructure upon which actions and events of relevance to the regulations arise, is not
corrupted. For example, if the underlying messaging system is corrupted and delivers bogus
messages or fails to deliver correct messages, the integrity of the regulated MAS would be
violated. In general, such threats from the infrastructure are a major security threat to a
regulated MAS. Figure 2 captures the intuition that the regulated MAS ought to control the
relevant aspects of the physical world. For example, eBay viewed as a regulated MAS controls
the infrastructure through which auctions are created by sellers and bid submitted by buyers.
Such control is essential for eBay to determine which bids were in time, who if anyone won
an auction, what item did they buy, and how much they committed to pay for it. In essence,
the regulated MAS takes responsibility for the physical world as a way to ensure its own
integrity. The above assumption of control, however, may not hold in practice—and arguably
is never met in practice. For example, underlying eBay’s infrastructure and its execution by
users lie computers and networks that eBay does not control. Thus we would need techniques
for regulated MAS to function correctly despite threats from the infrastructure. Indeed,
human societies are not paralysed because of the existence of such threats and norms can
provide a way of dealing with them.
4 Conceptual Model
This section describes the fundamental application-independent components that all open
interaction systems have in common. We base the foregoing claim, on our experience
[19, 25, 45]. Those application-independent parts should be integrated with application-
dependent concepts and concrete values of some parameters in order to realise an actual
interaction system. The main advantage of this model is that, in principle, it may be
used for the specification of a different type of systems used in different domains, from
the definition of marketplaces for the improvement of e-commerce to the definition of
collaborative/coordinating/social ecosystems for supporting collaborative work and social
coordination. In the following we will describe what we consider are the main components
for the design of those systems, how those components should be used for the realisation of a
system, and the main functionalities that should be implemented in those systems for their
correct execution. A fundamental assumption behind the definition of this model is that the
interacting parties are autonomous entities; that is. these agents may be human or software,
each agent has its own goals, each one belongs to a specific principal and, furthermore, each
of these agents may violate the norms that regulate its interactions with others.
4.1 Design Components
We may distinguish between those components whose main goal is to enable social interaction
among the participants agents, and those components whose main goal is to regulate such
interactions. Regarding the first type of components, we need to specify a set of conventions
for realising conversations or interactions. Those conventions regard:
The definition of the common ontologies that the agents need to share in order to
interact. They consists of concepts and properties used for describing the objects on
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which the interaction is focused and the shared knowledge of the interacting parties
that evolves during the interaction. Those ontologies have an application-independent
part that defines for instance the concept of action, event, obligation, and so on, and
an application-dependent part focused on the domain of the application. Some of the
concepts represented in those ontologies have a direct mapping to objects in the real
world, some other exists only in the institutional reality of the regulated MAS.
The definition of those actions that agents may perform. We assume that within the
regulated MAS, agents use only communicative acts for interacting. Those acts can be
defined in terms of the preconditions for their successful performance and in terms of
their effects on the state of the interaction, that is, on the state of a set of application
independent and dependent components whose existence is jointly accepted by the
interacting agents. For example, the effects of some communicative acts may be to create
or modify the normative relationship among the agents: an agent that bids for a product
in an auction commits to pay the amount of the bid. The fact that by performing
a communicative act an agent can change normative relationships at runtime, can be
modelled using constitutive rules [62] (X counts-as Y in C) for associating an appropriate
semantics to the communicative acts that agents perform within a specific protocol
enactment, except for declarations [27].
The definition of the relevant events that may happen during an interaction, (again in
term of preconditions and effects), the most common of which is the passing of time.
Events may be referred to in the content of communicative acts, for example, as a promise
to perform an action before a given deadline.
For example, in the definition of a marketplace the domain language might contain
a definition of the different types of products that may be exchanged, their properties,
some constrains that specify the conditions under which the values of their properties are
correct—for example rules for changing the price of a product—and some terminological
properties that are valid for the domain in question—like the fact that a bank transfer is
a particular type of payment. The actions can be the act of buying, selling, paying, and
delivering a product.
Regarding the components of the conceptual model devoted to regulate the interaction or
conversation of the agents, it is important to observe that very often in human social life,
interactions happen in a specific context; for example in a school, in a bar, in a market, in a
university. The context is useful for disambiguating the meaning of certain terms and their
properties, and for the fact that it introduces some predefined normative relationship among
the agents playing certain roles. This is usually done with the aim of bringing the interaction
to a certain final goal, for example an auction can be used to reach an agreement on the
price of a given product, an exam is used to grade a student. Moreover, this is useful for
avoiding the complex task of starting every negotiation from scratch, where agents need to
reach agreements on the rules of the interaction.
As the preceding remark suggests, it is fundamental to clearly define the context where
the interaction will take place and the norms that will regulate the interaction in that
context. It is also important to regulate agent interactions in such a way that agents may
benefit from their autonomy. In order to make it possible for the interacting agents to profit
their autonomy, it is important to regulate their interaction in a way that allows them as
much freedom as possible to choose what communicative action to perform among the set of
available ones. Therefore it is necessary to be able to express a list of normative constrains
that can specify:
What actions are permitted. One possible default for the system is that if an action is
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not permitted, it is prohibited, and the prohibition can be violated. Another default may
be that every action by default is permitted, unless it is explicitly prohibited, and the
prohibition can be violated.
What actions are prohibited in a regimented fashion (prohibitions that cannot be violated).
In the OCeAN model [25] in order to avoid confusion between this notion of prohibition and
the previous one, this notion of prohibition is formalised using the notion of institutional
power [43]: if an agent does not have the institutional power to perform an institutional
action (an action that changes the value of a property whose value is shared by all the
agents involved in the interaction, the effects of the attempt to perform the action are
void;
What actions are obligatory, and obligations can be violated. Very often an obligation
has an associated deadline that specifies the instant of time when the obliged action has
to be performed.
Given that those context-dependent norms are often defined at design time, they are
expressed in terms of the roles that the agents will be able to play at run time. Those roles
very often are related by subsumption and incompatibility relationships that create a social
model for the agents.
Usually those normative constraints are in force in a specific and delimited context of
interaction that should be clearly represented in the model and should be distinguished from
other contexts where usually other norms, other roles, and other ontologies apply. Those
contexts of interaction may be called scenes [54], spaces [73], orgs [69], or groups (when
their distinguishing characteristic is represented by the agents involved in the interaction).
The introduction of the construct of contexts of interaction as an application independent
component of the model requires to define the rules for regulating the creation at runtime of
new contexts of interaction, for letting agents enter and exit from contexts, and for destroying
a given context.
4.2 Design Functionalities
In order to actually enable an open interaction among autonomous-heterogenous agents
belonging to different principals, the previously described components should be properly
formalised for the specific application domain where the interaction system will be used.
For example, in the definition of an e-marketplace the different types of auctions (English,
Dutch, double, . . . ) and contracts should be specified (these are the contexts of interaction),
in terms of domain ontologies, roles (seller, buyer, auctioneer, participant, . . . ), actions
(buying, selling, paying, bidding, . . . ), and norms for regulating the performance of the
actions available in a given space.
Once a system is defined, it is necessary, before its execution, to test if the formalisation
has some specific properties. For example, to test that the definitions of all the ontologies
are consistent, that the defined roles are all used, that the preconditions for the performance
of the intended actions may be satisfied and that that the applicable norms are not in
contradiction—in spite of the fact that when norms refer to intervals and instants of time,
deadlocks are difficult to check at design time and hence usually need to be dealt with
at runtime. Another important functionality is the one for proving that all the possible
evolutions of the interaction system are constrained within a given set of boundaries that
will allow the interacting agents to reach certain predefined goals.
Usually the process of realising those functionalities depends on the language used for
formalising the system at design time (see 9.1.1 below). For example, if logical languages
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like decidable description logics (DL) (that are the basis of Semantic Web Languages like
OWL) are used, then some of those properties may be checked thanks to the use of available
DL reasoners (like Pellet or HermiT1).
Once a formal specification is finalised and some of its properties are checked, it will be
used at runtime for actually executing an open dynamic interaction system whose components,
i.e., agents and norms, may dynamically change during the interaction. This process will be
described in detail in the following section.
5 Operational Model
Given the conceptual model introduced in the previous section, here we describe the challenges
that are important to take into account from an operational perspective. That is, we identify
the specific concerns that need to be addressed when developing a normative multi-agent
system.
5.1 Operational Components
The first challenge one needs to address when designing a normative multi-agent system
is promulgation: when and how are norms created into the normative environment within
which norm-regulated interactions take place. There are (at least) two possible approaches.
Design-time norms. The most common approach regarding norm promulgation consists of
relying on the system designer to anticipate the possible encounters that are to be governed
using a normative approach, and to define the norms most suitable to those encounters.
While keeping the possibility of addressing an open scenario in which interacting agents
are concerned, this approach assumes that norm promulgation is a design challenge. Such
perspective fits many real-world applications identified in Section 2.
Runtime norms. Some applications of normative multi-agent systems inherently require
that the norms applicable to a certain interaction are at least adopted at runtime. A
typical case is electronic contracting [45]: when establishing a contract, two (or more) agents
negotiating on behalf of their principals choose the normative setting that will regulate the
enactment of such contract (e.g., by specifying the type of the contract they are establishing).
More sophisticated norm specification mechanisms include, on one side, the negotiation (or
configuration) of norms, as well as their assembly and, on the other side, the emergence of
social norms as discussed in Chapter 5.
Another operational concern in a normative multi-agent system is related to the observ-
ability of agent actions. This concern is directly related with the functional purpose of a
norm, which is to be able to distinguish compliant from noncompliant behaviours. It is
therefore a crucial aspect of norm monitoring to be able to assess the relevant agent actions
that enable the normative environment to determine whether norms are being complied with
or not. Observability is particularly tricky when dealing with prohibition norms. In some
applications (e.g., auditing), when dealing with obligations an assumption of self-motivated
compliance demonstration can be in place, i.e., it is in the best interest of agents to publicise
fulfilment. Detecting prohibition violations, on the other hand, is much harder because it
demands for a pervasive character of the monitoring system; in practice, different verifiability
levels exist [76] regarding the actions agents can perform.
1 http://clarkparsia.com/pellet/, http://hermit-reasoner.com/
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Closely related with this challenge is the choice of implementation of norms [38], which
is tightly coupled with the freedom agents are allowed when playing in the normative
environment. Two approaches have been pursued: (i) regimentation, which prevents unwanted
outcomes by imposing constraints; (ii) enforcement [37], which consists of using mechanisms
to influence the decisions agents make, letting them choose whether to fulfil or violate norms.
Regimented norms are only viable in totally controlled scenarios, in the sense that agent
autonomy is reduced by making sure that disallowed behaviours do not have any effect in the
system (this is the original approach to engineering electronic institutions [54, 21]). On the
other hand, enforcement means that external (as far as the agents themselves are concerned)
mechanisms must be put in place so as to influence agent behaviour. Examples of such
mechanisms include, among others, sanctions (either normative or utilitarian), incentives, or
reputation.
Sanctions, in particular, may be employed following two different (nonexclusive) policies:
retribution aims at compensating the addressee of a violation, while deterrence puts an
emphasis on punishing the violator so as to discourage future violations. Taking into account
this distinction, it may be desirable to incorporate both sanctions that concern actions to be
performed by the violator and sanctions that materialise as actions that the norm enforcer is
authorised to perform [24].
As stated above, monitoring is a central operational component in normative multi-agent
systems. In rich social interaction scenarios there may also be a need to address blame
assignment, in the sense that norm infraction may not entail guilt of the agent that is the
subject of the violation taking place.
Summarising, when designing a normative multi-agent system a number of core opera-
tional components have to be engineered. This section has identified norm promulgation,
observability, monitoring and enforcement as the key elements to be addressed. Additional
concerns are raised in Section 9.
5.2 Operational Functionalities
From a functional perspective, and from the point of view of interacting agents, when
designing a normative multi-agent system, a number of concerns need to be addressed. These
are related to the operational components identified above.
The first functionality is important in open systems, and concerns the possibility for
agents to enter and leave a normative multi-agent system. When entering the system, an
agent adheres to the set of norms that regulate agents behaviour. Admission may encompass
specific constraints that must be met. Leaving the system may demand for checking certain
conditions (e.g., the agent must not have any pending obligations).
Another important functional aspect is the establishment and updating of norms at
runtime. When enabling this possibility, it is necessary to engineer appropriate mechanisms
that allow agents to negotiate the norms that guide their further interactions and to feed
those norms into the normative environment. Accommodating specific infrastructures may
facilitate this task, e.g., through coordination artefacts [40] or normative frameworks [46].
Naturally, the next functionality concerns enactment, i.e., designing the means through
which agent interactions are assessed by the system. This is intrinsically related with the
challenge of observability, and is crucial to allow for monitoring to take place.
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6 Evolution
In general terms, when considering the evolution of a normative system, one needs to consider
two kinds of changes: norm promulgation, which consists on establishing a new norm; and
norm derogation, which removes a norm. Modifying a norm, e.g., by changing its applicability
conditions, may be seen as a derogation followed by a promulgation.
A first step towards encompassing evolution in the normative multi-agent system has
already been identified in the previous section, and concerns normative dynamism from
the agents’ point of view. When norms are to be created at runtime [45], the normative
environment denotes an evolving facet. It may also be the case that within a particular
institution, different organisations are established at runtime. Those organisations may have
their own normative structure [75].
Typical in these approaches is to embed into the normative system some kind of infra-
structure determining the normative changes that can be introduced. This infrastructure,
specified at design-time, dictates the changes at runtime that agents may introduce in the
normative system (their degrees of freedom [1]).
Dynamism may also be an important and desirable property from the normative system’s
point of view. In this case, two questions need to be addressed. The first question relates to
how to evaluate the performance of the system as a whole. The second one relates to the
changes that can be introduced in the normative multi-agent system so as to improve its
overall performance.
Performance evaluation demands for an analysis of how effective a normative system is in
terms of regulating the multi-agent environment. One may approach this issue by observing
the behaviour of agents and assessing if the population as a whole complies with the norms:
if it does not, some changes in the normative system may need to be introduced, e.g., by
adjusting enforcement levels (as in [49]). In some cases, however, excessive or inadequate
regulation may hinder the system by preventing some better overall performance from taking
place. In such situations, although agents may be complying with norms, it might be in the
best interest of the system for them to do otherwise.
Noncompliance can therefore be seen as an opportunity to change the normative system,
by considering violations as alternative enactments that must be reacted-upon through
changes in the normative structure. Those changes are not targeted to deviating agents, but
instead towards the normative system as a whole.
Another aspect of change to take into account are the propagation effects of norm
introduction and updates (see Ch. 2).
A possible approach to enable a runtime evolution of the normative system is to allow
the designer to specify at compile-time a normative transition function that specifies the
feasible norm changes and the conditions for their realisation [7, 74]. This approach however
assumes it is possible to anticipate each normative update that the system may need.
7 Mapping to Other Perspectives
In this section, we discuss some approaches and conceptions of multi-agent systems that bear
some similarity to regulated multi-agent systems (MAS), but turn out to be fundamentally
different. In all of these, a regulated MAS-based modelling approach would potentially be a
better fit.
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7.1 Sociotechnical Systems
Traditionally, the field of sociotechnical systems has been concerned with the interplay
between humans and technology in an organisational setting: how technology affects humans
and vice versa. It developed with the recognition that the efficiency-focused design of work
removed from the concerns of the workers or end-users (the social components) and the
culture of the organisation tends to end up being self-defeating. This theme was picked up
in software engineering in two major ways: (1) how to understand, elicit, and model the
requirements for sociotechnical systems and how to manage change [53, 33, 2], and (2) how to
model sociotechnical systems themselves [83]. Often, there was substantial overlap between
the two, for example, as in i* [83]. Closer to the multi-agent systems literature, Flores et al.’s
well-known work on the design of work [23] is best seen in the light of sociotechnical systems.
However, unlike regulated MAS, models of sociotechnical systems developed in software
engineering are invariably conceptually centralised. This means that conceptually there would
be a single thread of control in the system. Baxter and Sommerville [2], for instance, ascribe
goals to the system; the system would potentially adapt in pursuit of its goals. Further, in
their conception, systems are hierarchically decomposed into subsystems, each of which may
either be a social component or a technical component. Yu’s [83] models are peer to peer;
however, his approach is mentalist and therefore implies conceptually centralised systems.
Models of sociotechnical system may well support physical distribution via the notion of
components. One could then talk about the “interactions” among the components. These
interactions, however, are merely technical in the sense that they are merely the means to an
end—the system goals. Thus even though a system may be physically distributed, it remains
conceptually centralised. In fact, it turns out that all of traditional software engineering has
a conceptually centralised perspective on systems [14]. The reason is that even the most
fundamental conception of systems in software engineering is machine-oriented. In other
words, the primary objective of software engineering is to design machines that transform
inputs to suitable outputs. The conceptual centralisation in software engineering is not
surprising given that sociotechnical systems research, even outside of software engineering,
has largely confined itself to organisational settings.
Regulated MAS represent a more general model for sociotechnical systems. With regulated
MAS, one can model inter-organisational settings, which cannot be modelled with current
approaches. Further, one can potentially argue that even for intra-organisational applications,
regulated MAS-based models would be superior to the top-down models of traditional
software engineering, because, after all, even within an organisation there would be multiple
autonomous agents. Many of the approaches advocated by those in sociotechnical systems
research and software engineering (for example, ethnomethodology and other methods from
the social sciences) could potentially be employed toward the design of regulated MAS just
the same as a centralised sociotechnical systems.
7.2 Agent-Oriented Software Engineering
Can agent-oriented software engineering (AOSE) be employed for designing regulated MAS?
The answer is no. Although, many AOSE approaches give prominence to interaction, they
take a conceptually centralised perspective. Some AOSE approaches are logically centralised
approaches geared toward efficient problem-solving. Jennings [41], for example, describes
a scheduling problem that is addressed by distributing it across intelligent agents. Both
Zambonelli et al. [84] and Vázquez-Salceda et al. [77] acknowledge the distinction between
open and closed systems and emphasise interactions. However they falter in important
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details, betraying if not conceptually centralised mindsets, at least considerable conceptual
difficulties. For example, Zambonelli et al. (p. 328) identify the “resources that the MAS can
exploit, control or consume when it is working toward the achievement of the organisational
goal.” Vàzquez-Salceda et al. model the objectives of social systems as goals; further, the
social systems are themselves controllers (p. 338): “Facilitation roles are usually provided by
agents controlled by the society, and follow a trivial contract.” Tropos [4], another prominent
AOSE methodology, is goal-oriented and advocates a top-down system design process starting
with stakeholder goals and ending with the coded “agents”.
7.3 Design Norms
A regulated MAS displays the following characteristics.
The norms are social in that they are relations among agents.
The norms are social in that the state of a norm would progress only due to explicit
communication among agents. Logically, the social state of a regulated MAS is a
conjunction over the states of individual norms. The specification of how communication
affects the norms is referred to as a protocol.
The social state of a MAS may be computed by observing the communications in the
MAS. The social state is distinct from the internal state of any of the agents in the MAS;
in general, there may be no overlap between the two (although in distributed systems,
there would be no unique social state because of asynchrony; instead, there would be a
local social state corresponding to the messages each agent observes [15]).
Commitments, for example, are created, discharged, delegated, and so on only by explicit
communication—in distributed systems, via asynchronous messaging—among the agents.
Commitment protocols specify how commitments among agents progress with interaction
[82]. Analogously to commitments, Singh extends the treatment to other kinds of norms
such authorisation, power, and so on [69].
The above characteristics set regulated MAS apart from approaches where norms are
inserted into agent designs by fiat. This includes the social laws-based approach [63], which
is essentially a distributed artificial intelligence approach. In the design-by-fiat approaches,
the agents are not autonomous (they do not represent real world principals); they are instead
agents in the technical sense. Social laws, which are sometimes referred to as norms, are
essentially constraints on agent designs (specified with respect to a state space common to
all agents). By contrast, norms in regulated MAS are not constraints on agent design; in
fact, they make no reference to agent designs whatsoever.
Regulated MAS is a more general approach than social laws. One can potentially design
agents to conform with the norms established during their interaction; however, one cannot
apply the social laws approach to models systems of autonomous agents.
7.4 Compliance
Norms in regulated MAS are intimately tied with the idea of compliance. Broadly speaking, an
agent is compliant with a norm if it does not violate it. Hence, compliance is fundamentally
a runtime correctness criterion. Further, it can be determined by observing solely the
communications of the agent (both to and from) [78, 70, 60] (this is because of the notion of
social state discussed above). This is a crucial point: that compliance would be determined
from observations implies that one does not have to look into agent designs to determine
compliance (which would be impossible anyway in systems of autonomous agents). This
Chapte r 04
108 Regulated MAS: Social Perspective
should not be taken to mean that one cannot design agents for compliance. Given a set of
norms, one can design agents to comply with the norms. Some refer to this design problem as
that of compliance; we, however, reserve the term compliance for the runtime sense described
above.
If an agent is noncompliant, a compensating norm may kick in, and if an agents violates
that as well, then another compensating norm, and so on. At some point though, some norm
for which no compensatory norm is specified may potentially be violated. At that point, we
say that the violation must be handled outside the regulated MAS; in other words, it must
be escalated to the surrounding organisational context [75]. Hence, it seems useful to frame
a broader notion of compliance that would take into account the relations among norms (for
example, via compensation) and its potential escalation outside the regulated MAS. Singh’s
idea of explicitly representing the context of commitments in a MAS as an agent [66] could
be useful in capturing this broader notion of compliance. In [71], Singh et al. present several
patterns of commitments that involve the use of the context agent.
Norms in regulated MAS serve as logical bases for compliance. They not only specify
the conditions for compliance, but also who is responsible to whom. Compliance has
received much attention in the business process community; however, this community mostly
approaches it as a design problem, for example, as in [35, 64]. These approaches resemble
the design-by-fiat approach discussed above: they lack the observational perspective, having
no notion of communication and social state.
8 Demonstration: GOI a Sociotechnical System for Open Innovation
The Green Open Innovation platform (GOI) is a sociotechnical system to support “open
innovation” [12] in the realm of sustainable economy. It enables business interactions among
a community of firms and individuals who are interested in potential collaboration.2
GOI was originally conceived as some sort of social network portal with the standard
“Facebook” functionalities—group definition, private mail, forums and “like” / “dislike”
markings—on top of which there would be one interaction context for inscribing a “challenge”
(either as an offer or as a request) and another interaction context for a “prediction market”
(to show support to challenges).
In practice, though, the design evolved so that the platform is articulated around
an “agreement space” that consists of four specialised contexts of interaction (agreement
preparation, agreement negotiation, agreement monitoring, and quality assurance) that
make use of multiple on-line services and repositories to support social coordination (not
unlike what is advocated below in Section 10.2). Additionally, the platform is designed to
support API s for some standardised activities like crowd-sourcing and prediction markets,
plus mash-ups and partnering for ancillary services like an employment market and some
environmental certification services. Figure 3 sketches that setup. The system is designed to
allow humans and software agents to participate.
The system may be recognised as a regulated MAS in as much as the platform provides
the first three components of a normative architecture described in section 2 in P. 96.
Namely, a virtual space, a common ontology and an interaction model. In fact, the platform
provides an institutional infrastructure in the sense that it regiments ontology and means
2 GOI is a proof of concept prototype for the development of a commercial sociotechnical system. It is an
on-going project involving several private companies, NGO’s and universities. It is partially funded by
grants from the Spanish and regional governments.
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Figure 3 The GOI platform.
of communication, as well as the procedures that govern how to pass from one context of
interaction to other and the procedures that certain processes must follow. For example, the
platform regiments how challenges are issued, taken-up and monitored, or how to contest an
active agreement. However, the agreement space also includes norms that may be violated
as well as devices to contend with violations; thus containing the last two components of a
normative architecture.
The agreement space, in broad terms, hosts a population of agents that are entitled to
enter into agreements and are “active”—i.e., ready to be invited to an agreement, searching
for partners for establishing an agreement, or being involved in the negotiation or in the
enactment of an agreement—and are “ubiquitous”—i.e., agents may be involved in several
agreements at a given time. The space is “open”—in the sense that agents may enter and
leave at will—and it has some regimented ground rules on what are the primitive and atomic
actions, the procedures that govern the basic agreement process cycle from start to end
and the procedures to access and update GOI repositories and invoke services, as shown in
Figure 4.
Perhaps the most interesting element of the GOI platform is that some agreements that
are reached and executed inside the agreement space are in fact contracts whose clauses are
negotiated among parties and their execution is monitored by the platform. The platform
provides different means to facilitate this contracting. For instance, it has a repository of
model contracts, whose clauses are standard and therefore negotiation is reduced to agreeing
on parameters. Another resource is the availability of negotiation procedures that take the
form of virtual “negotiation rooms” where a GOI member requests the platform a “room”
to negotiate a contract. This member may want a room to hold an open call for tenders,
hence may also request to have GOI staff run the tender for him (with software agents that
perform the duties of, say, gate-keeper and auctioneer). Another member may, likewise, wish
to negotiate one single model contract with N different potential partners simultaneously and
would therefore require N rooms for one-to-one-negotiation, each with a software mediator
with some explicit criteria for rejecting and admitting counteroffers, and a single arbiter to
close the deal. Since not all contracts are honoured and some may be contested by other GOI
members, the platform also provides means to resolve disputes, both in the form of automated
ODR facilities or by making expert (human) mediators available. Finally, the platform keeps
track of all actions where it is involved and therefore keeps information about participants
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Figure 4 Main functionalities of the agreement space.
and transactions and uses it to provide different forms of quality assurance ranging from “blue
book” rankings of members to specific trust and reputation measures that may be associated
to particular agreements, types of agreements, communities and subcommunities, and so
on. In other words, the GOI platform involves a regulated multi-agent system where each
agreement includes its own normative content, is subject to some procedural and functional
norms that regulate how it may be signed and how it should be executed, is also subject
to the norms that govern malpractice and defaulting and, finally, some forms of quality
assurance rules apply to it.
The GOI platform has a centralised design and its evolution is for the moment limited
to the changes brought about by the addition of new services and interaction contexts.
From an implementation perspective, the platform environment is also centralised, although
agreements are distributed processes. Actually, there is also a central governance model for
the basic operation, however each agreement spawns a (sub)context of interaction that is
governed by its own norms and whose effects are, in principle, not propagated to the contexts
of other agreements.3
9 A Map of Open Problems
This section outlines some open problems around the core notions of regulated MAS. The
outline follows the three main phases of the regulated MAS lifecycle (design, enactment and
evolution) and then focusses within those phases on some activities that are characteristic
of normative environments in general. For each of those activities we mention those topics
we find particularly relevant for norMAS and where we consider open problems abound.
3 Each agreement generates a local institutional state that is part of the GOI institutional state (see
Page 114) but the platform ought to guarantee the integrity and identity of agents and their institutional
facts, thus some regimented control is imposed on the validation of agreements and their monitoring.
Implementation follows the ideas discussed in [22, 19, 32]; hence, in essence, the agreement space is a
large institution where each agreement is a new sub-institution that is specified and run peer-to-peer on
demand.
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Figure 5 Some challenging topics within the lifecycle of regulated multi-agent systems.
Figure 5 summarises this outline. We elaborate on concerns introduced in Sections 4, 5 and 6
but note that while in this section we simply allude to some salient topics that we believe
deserve a more thorough treatment, in the next section the authors of this chapter delineate
some open problems that they find alluring.
9.1 Design Phase
Several design challenges emerge around the methodology for developing regulated MAS
and the need for good enough metamodels to describe and specify them. In the case of
methodology, the space for innovation is in dealing with those aspects that pertain to
normative notions and how these are merged with the more conventional aspects for which
methodologies have been proposed (see Section 10.2). In what corresponds to metamodels,
the goal is to specify in a cohesive way all the components of the regulated MAS (see
Section 5 and 10.1 below). The following subsections discuss several issues that need to
be taken into account at design, in this section, however, we limit the discussion to design
choices in two areas. On one hand, the creation of a boot-strapping nucleus of a regulated
system including the particular norms and other regulatory devices (like normative roles,
enforcement mechanisms or validation methods) that constitutes the original regulated MAS;
and, on the other hand, a proclamation process that makes that original regulated MAS
ready to be enacted and used by participants. Each of these areas include topics that are
rich in concepts and complex in operationalisation, hence open for innovation.
9.1.1 Creation
Assuming proper methodology and metamodels are at hand, one still has to deal with the
particular choices for each component of the regulated MAS in order to specify the system
and make it operational. Let’s review three areas of opportunity associated to the process of
creation itself:
What is in a norm? The normative elements of a regulated MAS may have implicit require-
ments whose representation should properly take into account. These are a few that may
be worth elucidating.
First, there are three key questions worth posing with respect to the intended purpose
of the norms: (1) What is the role that the norm is intended to play? One may want
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norms to serve as a way of restricting unwanted actions and promoting desirable outcomes
(hence appropriate descriptions of obligations and prohibitions are essential); likewise one
could design them as a means to reducing the number of possible actions or outcomes
in order to simplify the decision-making of participants (hence the representation of
procedural norms needs to be paid special attention); moreover, norms may also be
understood as a manner of creating a space for interaction (thus constitutive norms
are paramount), or eventually the promotion of some collective objectives (in this case,
then, such objectives should be properly captured in the form of the norms and their
compliance incentives). (2) What are the values that norms promote? Values like fairness,
trustworthiness, accountability are usually associated with the normative system as a
whole but particular norms and their combination bias the system in one direction or
another. Thus for example, full observability and strict governance may contribute to
transparency, regimentation towards trustworthiness and unobtrusive governance towards
flexibility. (3) What are the pragmatic benefits of a norm? The question here is to be
able to establish a proper trade-off between the costs of observance and enforcement of
norms and those of compliance and noncompliance. Some norms may have little effect on
the reliability of the system but still impose agents an undue cost in deciding whether or
not to comply with them; some norms may be practical for some population profiles and
not for others and different sanctions may adapt better to some situations than others.
Next, there are three considerations with respect to the formal features of the structure
of the norm to keep in mind to make sure that such structure is appropriate with respect
to the desired expressiveness of the norm, the conditions for adoption of the norm and
their compliance by agents and the governance mechanisms of the system: (1) The choice
of the syntax, the constitutive elements involved (label, conditions of activation, deontic
features, beneficiary, subject, . . . ) and the ancillary elements associated with the norm
(linked norms, contrary to duty actions, . . . ). (2) The crispness of the statement of the
norm and its applicability. In other words: Is the way that the norm is expressed and
enacted precise enough for the fulfilment of its intended purpose? Is there an objective
way of determining when an agent is complying or not with a norm? Does the expression
of the norm achieve some desirable degree of flexibility (for discretional enforcement, to
adapt properly to the evolution of population or changes of the application context)? (3)
Coherence of the normative corpus. This has to do with the different formal properties that
the system as a whole should exhibit. In some cases the preferred notion is that of logical
consistency but in some cases it may suffice with a narrower notion of conflict-free sets
of norms or, in more general terms, in choosing some particular notion of “consequence”
that is appropriate for the system. Depending on those preferences, the designer would
have to answer questions like: May conflicts be dealt with during runtime? Are there
possibilities of deadlocks? Are there any norms that are impossible to comply with?
How to enforce norms when the system has not proven to be conflict-free? Are norms
conducive to the overall purpose of the regulated MAS? To what extent?
Finally, the design of the system should take into account what an agent is intended
to do with norms. There are three capabilities that are assumed of agents in this respect:
Reasoning about norms: What are the decision-making capabilities needed by agents in
order to comply with the promulgated and active normative elements? To what extent
are agents presumed to infer the state of the system in order to know whether a norm
applies, has been violated and what the consequences of a violation might be? Adoption
of norms: Is the ontology of the regulated MAS compatible with the norm (i.e., with
respect to the objects, actions, roles, and such involved in the norm)? Is the governance
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structure appropriate for enforcing the norm (detection, blame assignment, sanctioning
and reparation)? Is pertinent information about entitlements, co-dependence of normative
elements, effects of noncompliance, and so on properly represented and communicated to
implicated parties? Compliance with norms: What behaviour is perceived and by whom?
What information about a norm should an agent be informed of: social values associated,
whether or not it is active, conditions of application, regulated reactions, subjects of the
norm, consequences of not-compliance, liability, enforceability conditions?
Legislative style. The designer needs to make choices about the normative features that
have to be functional when the sociotechnical system is originally enacted and how those
features should evolve once the system becomes active. Three matters of concern may
affect those choices and all three have plenty of open problems.
Locus of control: The issue is to determine who controls the changes that take place
in the normative system. One extreme is a “demiurgic” style: the designer that creates
the regulated system has control of it as a whole and introduces changes as needed. The
other extreme is where a minimal set of regulations are instituted and participants are
able to introduce new norms and appropriate forms of observability and enforcement once
the system is in operation. Because the reasons for introducing a change and the choice of
the type of change that best applies, are manifold, the usual solution is an intermediate
position. However, as discussed below in 9.3, finding out how to determine what those
intermediate positions are, and how to implement them is almost unexplored territory.
Other design choices determine the balance between regimentation and the different
degrees of enforceability. What are the matters that should be taken into account? For
instance, considerations about accountability, robustness, and transparency may tilt the
balance towards regimentation, while on the other hand addressing or allocating risk
through constitutive conventions (e.g., requiring bonds and guarantees from principals, or
relying on a conventional legal system to deal with severe transgressions), or the need for
flexibility together with the presumption of reliable autonomous agents tilt the balance
towards self-governance.
A third closely related matter is the regulation attitude. In this case, again, in most
cases the final choice is bounded by two opposite styles. On one side is what we may call
“preemptive enforcement” where—as in a typical Napoleonic legal tradition—presuming
any agent would break the law if given a chance, the system designer anticipates all
possible infractions, makes these and their ad-hoc corrective reactions explicit, and
commits to a strict enforcement of this list. On the other side there is a “laissez faire”
attitude where it s presumed that most individuals abide by the law most of the time.
In this case—mimicking a Common Law tradition—undesired behaviour is expressed in
general terms and only when someone is caught cheating and proven guilty after a due
process, a harsh exemplary punishment is applied.
Validation of the design. With the remarks in Section 3 in mind, there is room for innovation
with respect to testing and validation of the system from the formal as well as the
engineering perspectives. For instance, the off-line validation of the sets of norms under
different criteria and techniques, from model-checking to coherence theory. Computational
complexity of norm-abidance and scalability of the system with respect to the increase of
norms and agents. Expressiveness of metamodels with respect to the intended performance
of the regulated MAS. Reliability of the operationalisation processes. Although we are
referring here to validation at design-time, there are limitations to what may be tested
and proven off-line, hence some runtime validation may be needed, should be considered
as part of the design and then implemented. In these matters the key is reaching an
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appropriate balance between what may be proved and what is satisfactory from an
engineering perspective.
9.1.2 Proclamation
This process involves two aspects: on the one hand, how participating agents need to be
informed about the system so that they will be able to play accordingly, and on the other
hand, what needs to be operational so that the system may be enacted. Mirroring standard
legal practice we may distinguish two sources of design choices where interesting problems
arise: publication of the conventions and their activation.
Publication. The designer will have to commit towards those elements that need to be
working from the start of and will also need to decide for each one of these elements how
to make them known, when, and to whom. A mere enumeration of the elements involved in
publication is enough to show the richness of this topic: constitutive conventions (ontology,
primitive and nonprimitive actions, interaction model, access requirements, entitlements),
architecture of the system (governance model, dynamics), normative content (different
types of norms and metanorms) and eventually, the operational semantics of the system.
The “how” part has two dimensions: the degree of formality (logical or otherwise) of
those components and the process by which the components are made part of the system.
Another aspect where innovation is needed is in the ergonomic side of communicating
those elements: what type of expression, syntax, interface are appropriate, when, and for
whom.
Activation. Some conventions—including most regimented constraints—are established at
design time to become active the moment the system is enacted and hence are applicable
from the start to any agent that intends to participate. However, while the system is
being enacted, norms may be added, modified or revoked and these situations start to
apply to participants at some point. Generally speaking, such activation may be triggered
either by time (e.g., so many days after it is published) or by an event (e.g., once a
commitment is made). The challenges in this topic come from different sources: from the
regulated MAS perspective, the immediate ones are how to validate that an agent that
intends to participate complies with the conventions that regiment its admission, and
then how the system deals with latent norms. From an individual agent’s perspective,
how is an agent made aware of those norms that may be applicable to it.
9.2 Enactment Phase
We do not touch upon the computational and implementation aspects of enactment, only
on some topics that may be interesting from a regulatory perspective while the system is
active. Furthermore, for sake of brevity, most of our comments refer to noncompliance with
norms (and the corresponding negative sanctions), although they apply mutatis mutandi to
the compliance of actions that have a positive reward associated.
9.2.1 Observability
Institutional State. The essential feature of regulated systems is that there are norms that
individuals may or may not infringe. Hence, at some points, although individuals decide
whether to comply with applicable norms, the system as a whole, or its enforcement
devices—and usually some participant agents as well—may have to assess that a com-
pliance or noncompliance took place. Such assessments involve the difficult technical
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(operational) problem of representing and updating the “institutional state” of the regu-
lated MAS (see Section 7.3). In other words, what are the values of those variables that
represent the institutional facts at a given moment, how atomic actions are filtered into
the regulated MAS and how those actions that are deemed “institutional” modify the
value of those variables.
Assuming that the institutional state is properly represented and implemented, the
designer still has to choose how this state is accessed by participants while actions are taking
place. In other words, the regulated MAS needs to address, the ex-ante aspects of “awareness”;
and the two complementary ex-post aspects of “transparency” and “accountability”. These
three types of aspects are solved by regulating what part of the institutional state is revealed,
to whom, when and how.
Awareness. The challenges in the ex-ante phase of compliance assessment reside in what is
revealed before an action takes place.
From an individual agent’s perspective, that revealed information is needed to support
two decision-making tasks: On the one hand, the individual agent needs to be aware
of that state of the system to realise what active norms apply to it in order to decide
whether or not to perform an action that may infringe those norms. On the other hand,
an individual needs to be aware of the state of the system in order to form expectations
about what may happen then: who may act, what actions may be attempted and what
effects these may have.
From the system’s perspective, the challenge is again twofold: to determine what
actions are feasible (nonregimented), and to determine which agents are subject to active
(nonregimented) norms and therefore have the possibility of complying or not with it.
Transparency and accountability. The first type of ex-post aspects, “transparency” refers
to what is revealed (to individuals and to the system) about actions that take place and
their institutional effects. “Accountability”, in turn, refers to information about who
performs an action and who is affected by that action. The two of them together become
input for determining awareness in subsequent institutional states. Both of them are,
evidently, key for enforcement and should consequently be in line with the enforcement
model of the system and the enforcement style we mentioned above. Both are particularly
challenging when the regulated mulitagent system involves nested or concurrent regulated
MAS where commitments established in one regulated MAS may have effects in other
regulated MAS. Transparency and accountability also need to address the complementary
aims of “need to know” and “need to share”.
The opacity of some actions may be appropriate. For instance, in some mediated
negotiations, only the mediator is informed of offers and counteroffers and each party is
unaware of what the other part is actually proposing. In some cases, while opacity is required
for some purpose, it needs to be compensated by some means. For instance, even if a
noncompliant action is itself opaque to law enforcer agents, an infraction may be inferred by
these agents if they perceive some effects of that action, or they are informed of the infraction
by other agents that witnessed or inferred it on their own; likewise, even if a punishable
action is perceived by an enforcer agent, the agent may decide—or be compelled—to ignore
it. Opacity may also have adverse effects. For instance, if an infraction is not immediately
dealt with, its indirect consequences may be difficult to foresee and contend with.
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9.2.2 Governance
This area includes those actions that follow the assessment of compliance. Namely the
processes of determining whether or not an infraction took place—analogously, a reward-
deserving action—and then react accordingly. In the judiciary tradition, governance involves
three main processes: prosecution, trial, and punishment. Although some of these issues have
already received attention from different perspectives, the topics are rich and still largely open
for regulated multi-agent systems. We will next describe the most salient ones in two areas,
blame assignment (involving prosecution and trial to some extent) and reactions (including
punishment and other). As with the previous paragraphs, our comments are biased towards
noncompliance and sanctions but similar ones would apply to rewards and desired actions.
Blame assignment. Given that a punishable (or reward deserving) action has occurred, the
challenges reside in determining that the action took place and should be punished (or
rewarded), determining who is involved and who is responsible for the infraction (or
reward). The assessment of infractions and culprits will depend on the observability of
actions and ultimately on the enforcement model of the system and the enforcement
style. For instance, if the enforcement of some norms is delegated to enforcer agents,
when these agents observe or infer the infraction, they would need to be able to identify
the beneficiaries along with the casualties associated with the infraction. Provided a
good level of accountability is available, these enforcers should then be able to assign
blame. Once the infraction is acknowledged and culprits identified, reparatory actions
and sanctions are enacted according to the norms that regulate these processes. The
process of determining who the culprits are is not necessarily straightforward because,
depending on the observability or the infraction, the identity of perpetrators may not be
revealed, and even if the agents who perform the invalid action are properly identified, it
may still be necessary to prove who the actual guilty parts are. In this case some sort of
due process needs to be activated. When a regulated multi-agent system contemplates the
existence of a due process, several components need to be in place. Namely, some notion
of proof that an infraction has occurred, the resources to elaborate and validate that
proof and the procedures that correspond to (i) bringing charges and evidence against
suspects, (ii) defending innocence against charges (iii) evaluating evidence and applicable
norms and (iv) formulating a resolution about the innocence or guilt of the accused.
Regulated reactions. The types of reactions that are worth studying may be organised in
two large blocks: punishment and reward on one hand and damage control.
Punishment and rewards. How the punishment is expressed (threat, argument ad
baculum, and others), Grounds for punishment (what needs to be proved to deserve that
punishment or reward). Purpose of punishment (to teach, to encourage, to retaliate),
types of punishment (direct or indirect, private or public, with rhetorical information
associated, with social or monetary cost). Management of punishment (whether it is
applicable on the spot, delegated to another regulated MAS, and so on).
Damage control. Identify direct and indirect effects of an infraction. Measure costs
of transgression, evaluate costs of detection, blame assignment, and punishment. Identify
and implement reparatory actions (fix damages, compensate victims). Here belongs the
challenging world of contrary-to-duty obligations that has received ample formal treatment
and whose implementation is nontrivial (see [13, 9, 34]).
P. Noriega, A. K. Chopra, N. Fornara, H. Lopes Cardoso, and M. P. Singh 117
9.3 Evolution Phase
Several remarks on this phase were made above in Section 6 and more will be made in the
last section of this chapter. Here we simply mention a few more open topics. and for the
sake of presentation we mention topics about only two aspects: performance evaluation and
change.
Note however, that from the design perspective (even when evolution is postulated as a
bottom-up process) it is advantageous to identify the several conditions that might make
the regulated system evolve and, consequently, include devices to handle that evolution.
One may argue that the type and protagonism of those devices depend largely on the
expected evolution of the system, and different types of devices will need proper grounds to
determine their application. In general, one would need to identify (in the metamodel and
the methodology) (i) a reasonable list of devices, (ii) for each device, the type of situations
that justify its use, (iii) the elements of the system that are involved in those situations and
(iv) the interplay of those elements in a given situation.
As an example to illustrate the richness of the problem, note that one of the many devices
to make a regulated system evolve is to change some of its norms; moreover, one of the ways
that norms may be changed is directly by the system (not by participants), and those changes
might be advisable, for instance, because performance of the system has decreased due to, for
example, changes in the population profile or the environmental conditions. Now realise that,
even in this rather simple case where we assume that one evolution device of the system is
to change norms, in order to decide what norms to change we would then need to foresee, at
design time, that performance of the system can be measured, that changes in population
and environmental conditions may be assessed, that the relationship of those changes with
performance are made explicit, that the set of norms that may be modified (added, deleted,
changed) in order to achieve the desired performance levels can be determined and, finally,
that the actual modifications may be accomplished.
9.3.1 Evaluation
Performance indicators. It is not unusual to have sociotechnical systems involving stake-
holders with competitive goals and thus having regulations intended to achieve equilibria
of different sorts. However it is not always clear how these equilibria might be identified
without an explicit reference to some variables involved in the operation of the system
and their combination as indicators that are meaningful in terms of the objectives of the
stakeholders or the system as a whole. In general, variables and indicators are useful
to assess the quality of the system (or parts of it) and to choose between alternative
implementations of regulations at design time and to guide evolution at runtime. It
is a challenging task to deal with performance indicators that evaluate how a system
performs or improves in important but elusive qualities such as fairness, trustworthiness,
and accountability.
Learning from experience. As suggested above, the choice and combination of performance
indicators depends not only on the objectives but also on the devices that are available to
make the system evolve and on the elements that are involved in the application of such
devices: from changing some parameters of a norm, to changing the set of norms. Part of
the tuning—not only of the original normative system but notably also of the evolution
mechanisms themselves—may be achieved at design-time by stress-testing and running
simulations; and there is ample opportunity for development of the current practices and
tools.
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9.3.2 Change
Operations on norms. A full typology of operations on the set of norms (promulgation,
amendment, suspension, abrogation, annulment, . . . ), as well as the operations on their
governance aspects and their implementation is still to be attempted from the regulated
MAS perspective. Some works in this community suggest [5, 74, 36] that a systematic
treatment of the different operations is far from trivial.
Metanorms. Another line of work that is largely open for research is to include all those
aspects that determine the dynamics of the system as a distinct core component of a
regulated MAS as postulated in Section 6 (p. 105). Several approaches may be taken and
a few have already deserved attention like, for example, the use of metanorms to choose
among predefined sets of norms [1, 7], or the use of case-based reasoning to introduce
new norms when conflict among norms are detected [52] but a holistic proposal towards
a general normative transition function, as suggested before in 10.4.1, is still to appear.
10 Authors’ Perspectives
This section is meant to complement the rest of the chapter by including personal views of
the authors. Each author has chosen topics, length and structure.
10.1 Noriega: In Light of Applications
I would like to make the following remarks under the light of regulated multi-agent systems
that are going to be used in open sociotechnical systems that are intended to work in the
real world.
In this context, what I believe to be the most fundamental task is to build a general
framework on top of which actual normative multi-agent systems may be specified and
implemented. By a framework I mean three main components: a normative architecture
or “metamodel” for the specification of normative multi-agent systems, the computational
counterpart of this metamodel that would allow to implement and run such specifications,
and the methodologies to guide the actual implementation of such norMAS.
Following the experiences reported in [19], I believe that such a metamodel can be built
along the lines described above in sections 3, 4 and 5, in order to support the five components
enumerated in Section 2. The computational counterpart should produce an “institutional
environment” where particular regulated MAS are enacted, all regimented constraints are
enforced and several regulated MAS may concurrently exist. That implementation may opt
for a centralised governing of the full environment (including the possibly several regulated
systems embedded in the shared institutional environment) or choose to have a distributed
architecture to handle particular norMAS [59]. The methodologies should facilitate four
activities: the proper specification, implementation and testing of particular norMAS—
including whatever agents are needed to perform those regulatory roles entailed by the
specification—and, in the fourth place, assess the adequacy of the implementation of the
norMAS with respect to the intended functionality in the world.
If taken to heart, this task involves several challenges that being already in this com-
munity’s agenda, as suggested in the previous section, are far from being won. The ones I
see as the most significant are the following:
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10.1.1 Achieving Good-Enough Expressiveness and Automation of the
Normative Languages
Let’s assume that the framework includes a rich enough meta-modelling ontology to cap-
ture several interaction models, normative corpora and governance models. Then, for the
specification of particular regulated MAS, it will be necessary to use several normative
languages (and many “types of norms”, e.g., Crawford and Ostrom [17]) and possibly non
standard notions of “consequence”, that should be compatible with the features discussed in
7.3 and 7.4. But, in addition, those norms will need to be accompanied with other linguistic
and formal construct so that the declarative and inferential features of such norms carry
the intended pragmatic load within the normative MAS. So, for instance, in order to deal
with procedural norms, it may be advantageous to use, say, commitment-based protocols,
hence one has to introduce a proper language [27, 82] as part of the regimented constraints.
Likewise, to implement contrary to duty functionalities, one needs declarative languages that
accommodate the subtleties of features like the set of linked norms, including sanctions and
reparations, as well as some automated means to support the complex inferential processes
involved in blame assignment and proper reparation.
The implementation of these features should take into account, not only what the regulated
systems themselves should be able to accomplish at run time, but also how agents (software
as well as humans) become informed of all those features; in order to take them into account
both at design and at running time.
10.1.2 Designing for Noncompliance
The framework, as I see it, serves a general-purpose boot-strapping function, in the sense
that it should support particular normative MAS and provide the environment where actual
normative MAS are embedded. Therefore, the metamodel should support the modelling of
different governance models and provide the expressive features to specify those different
governance models, and the framework should support their automation. Moreover, the
framework should support the interoperation of several of these regulated MAS in a common
environment.
In these conditions, regimented governance is unavoidable for certain aspects of the
environment (e.g., common ontology, atomic interactions, social semantics, how new regulated
MAS are embedded in the environment) and maybe also within the particular regulated
MAS. However, in addition, in most regulated MAS, one would need to have nonregimented
conventions that deal with the forms of enforcement described in page 104 and in Section 4.
In practical terms it is unlikely that there may be a general treatment of governance
modelling and implementation. Nevertheless, it is still hard but worth attempting to develop
some sort of “standard” devices to deal with the several aspects of governance (detecting,
ascertaining, evaluating, assigning blame, applying sanctions) and assemble such devices as
the enforcement model for a particular regulated MAS. Assuming regimentation is properly
handled in the framework (like suggested in [19]), there are two ways to approach the
enforcement of nonregimented regulation. The first one is to rely on an omniscient filtering
device—like the one needed for regimentation—that automatically produces all consequences
of a new fact, thus updating the institutional state [74, 40, 31]. The second one is to rely on
some form of law enforcement roles that are capable of perceiving some actions and react
with or without discretion in accordance with the relevant regulations; this applies also to
informal sanctions, applied by individuals who may not be playing proper law-enforcement
roles at all.
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Another path worth exploring is that given that transgressions will take place, the
governance model may in some instances grant the offender the benefit of doubt and allow
the wrongdoer to argue the case. This would serve two purposes, allow for some useful forms
of ambiguity and to improve regulations.
10.1.3 Designing with Ambiguity
Conventional legal institutions incorporate ambiguity in ordinary legislative practice for two
main reasons: to prevent overregulation and to allow practitioners and enforcers some leeway
for interpretation. These reasons also suggest the need and advantages of including ambiguity
as a design assumption for regulated MAS.
In general terms regulated MAS come across “opaque” contexts where some undesirable
situations are difficult to properly identify at design time. Some obvious situations are: (i)
Regulating the wrong problem. For example in the mWater system described in the next
chapter, it is easy to focus only on pricing conventions when the real problems reside in
the lack of supply and in the conflicts provoked by the use of traded rights. (ii) Regulating
the wrong population; for instance, unwittingly ruling out human agents, by setting the
bidding-clock pace in an auction too fast. (iii) Changing population: In the open innovation
scenario of Section 8, it is rather likely that the client base becomes more international
and more sophisticated as the level of activity increases. But then standard contracts and
quality assurance criteria would have to be tuned to the new situation [7]. (iv) Unforeseen
undesirable outcomes; In automated trading, software trading agents may have equivalent
bidding algorithms and enter into unending ties. (v) Volatile contexts where the grounds for
choosing particular actions may change depending on circumstances that, because of their
unpredictability or variety, are not worth hardwiring in stable norms, but rather be localised
to those contexts.
Mirroring the points just made, the following are obvious heuristics to start bringing
ambiguity into design: identifying volatile contexts in key business processes; building
malleability in constitutive norms (for instance, committing to a good-enough ontology while
including norms to update it); separating stable norms (that may be hardwired as regimented
or fully specified enforced regulations) from norms that are better represented in the system
as norms that govern decision-making of law enforcers; using flexible-enough governance
models and choosing performance indicators that measure different types of “fitness” of the
regulations.
At any rate, whatever heuristics are devised, the components where ambiguity will need
to be instrumented are the norms that govern the evolution of the system. And there is
where ultimate design with ambiguity will be achieved.
10.2 Chopra: Social Computing, A Software Engineering Perspective
The nature of applications is changing. Earlier they were logically-centralised; now they
are becoming increasingly interaction-oriented. Social networks, social cloud, healthcare
information systems, virtual organisations, and so on are evidence of the shift. In such
applications, autonomous social actors (could be individuals or organisations) interact in order
to exchange services and information. I refer to applications involving multiple autonomous
actors as social applications.
Unfortunately, software engineering hasn’t kept up with social applications. It remains
rooted in a logically centralised perspective of systems dating back to its earliest days
and continues to emphasise low-level control and data flow abstractions. In requirements
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engineering, for instance, the idea that specifications are of machines, that is, controllers, is
firmly entrenched. Software architecture applies at the level of the internal decomposition of
a machine into message-passing components. In other words, it helps us realise a machine as
a physically distributed system. However, the machine-oriented worldview cannot account
for social applications in a natural manner.
I understand social computing as the joint computation by multiple autonomous actors.
By “joint”, I refer simply to their interactions and the social relationships that come about
from the interaction, not necessarily cooperation or any other form of logical centralisation.
In fact, each actor will maintain its own local view of the social relationships—there is no
centralised computer or knowledge base. The relationships themselves may take the form of
commitments, trust, or some other suitable social norm. The purpose of the computation
may be to loan a bicycle or a couch to a peer, to schedule a meeting or a party, to carry out
a multiparty business transaction, to provide healthcare services, to schedule traffic in smart
cities, to manage the distribution of electricity in smart grids, to build consensus on an issue
via argumentation, or globally distributed software development itself—anything that would
involve interaction among autonomous actors.
Clearly, we are already building social applications, even with current software engineering
approaches. For example, online banking is a social application in which a customer interacts
with one or more banks to carry out payments, deposits, and transfers. Social networks
such as Facebook and LinkedIn facilitate interactions among their users. However, just
because we can build social applications, it does not mean we are building them the right way.
Right now, all these applications are built in a heavily centralised manner: banks provide all
the computational infrastructure; so does Facebook. Users of these infrastructures are just
that—users, no different from those of an elevator or an operating system. In other words,
current software engineering produces only low-level technical solutions.
My vision of social computing instead embraces the social. It recognises the autonomy of
actors. Instead of control flow or message flow, it talks about the meanings of messages in
terms of social relationships. Computation refers to the progression of social relationships
as actors exchange messages, not to any actor’s internal computations (although these too
could be accounted for). The different aspects of my vision constitute a challenging research
program. What form would specifications of social applications take? What would be the
principles, abstractions, and methodologies for specifying social applications? On what basis
would we say that an actor is behaving correctly in a social application? How would we
help an actor reason about specifications of social applications with respect to its own goals
and internal information systems? What kind of infrastructure would we need to run social
applications? The answers to these questions and the realisation of my vision will lead to a
software engineering vastly more suited to social applications.
10.3 Fornara: Formalising and Executing Open Normative Systems
The process of formalising at design time and executing at run time open interaction systems
where the behaviour of agents is regulated by norms, presents interesting open issues.
A first one regards how to choose and use existing formal and programming languages
and architectural solutions for defining and implementing in efficient and effective way open
interaction systems. Those type of systems are composed by many concepts that evolve
in time on the basis of the events that happen and the actions performed by the agents,
therefore one problem is efficiently represents the evolution in time of their state. A crucial
requirement in the specification of norms is that their content should be a description of the
action that should, should not, or can be performed by the agents: that is a description of a
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template of the action. In order to let the autonomous agents to exploit their capability to
dynamically plan their action by taking into account the norms that constrain their behaviour,
it would be better that those template should not describe the actions in all details. This by
making it possible that different concrete actions will match with the described template.
For example a norm may express the obligation to pay a certain amount of money to Robert
without specifying the actor of the action and making it possible to perform the payment in
many different ways, like for example by bank transfer or in cash or by cheque.
In those type of systems it is necessary to implement specific components for realising the
following required functionalities. First of all in order to enforce those norms it is necessary
to be able to efficiently compare and match the real actions that are performed by the agents
at runtime with their description formalised in the template of the action that is used as
content of the norm. Practically it is also necessary to define a component able to monitor
and to regulate (in the case of power) the evolution of the state of the system.
At least two more languages turn out to be necessary, one for the formalisation of the
concepts the other for the implementation of the functionalities. In this case fundamental
problems are how to combine them, and how to decide what to represent in a given language
and what in another.
Reusability is a strong requirement in the development of software systems, therefore
the definition of design mechanisms that make it possible to re-use at least part of a given
specification of a system is another important challenge. The process of designing and
developing open systems has to take into account also the design and development of the
agents able to interact through those systems. The openness of those systems and the fact
that they are running in an open network like Internet, implies that one agent may decide
to interact simultaneously with different systems and that one system can be modularised
in different components and distributed on different platforms, therefore a critical issue
is the possibility to combine different specifications with few or none added re-design or
re-programming work.
An important issue in open systems is related to how agents can perceive the shared state
of the system and in some cases, when declarative communicative acts have to be performed
(for example declaring an auction open) to use them for interacting with other agents.
Regarding this aspect there are interesting existing approaches and existing frameworks
coming from studies on distributed event-based systems and environments [81]. Agent
environments can be considered an interesting architectural component that can be used for
mediating agents action and for enabling agents to perceive the state of the interaction. The
functionalities of the environment can also be extended to realise the monitoring of agent
actions and the realisation of concrete mechanisms for norm enforcement. In this context,
an interesting challenge would be the study of how to integrate and extend existing formal
models and frameworks for the realisation of agent environments [6, 58] with the concepts
and functionalities required by open normative systems.
One possible approach for trying to tackle some of the previously described challenges
consists in formalising norms, and the corresponding obligations, prohibitions, permissions,
and institutional powers, using Semantic Web technologies. In particular by using OWL 2
DL, a description logic language recommended by W3C for Semantic Web applications, for
the specification of the main concepts of the model.
The main advantage of the choice of these languages is first the possibility to re-use
ontologies and combine them thanks to the fact that two or more ontologies can be simply
merged by taking the union of their axioms [39]. Another advantage is the possibility of
using the semantics of the concepts used to describe the template of the actions contained
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in the content of the norms to effectively match them with real actions that happen in the
system; for example being able to deduce that a bank transfer or a cash payment are both
payment. From the point of view of the technologies and tools available for supporting the
use of Semantic Web Technologies, important advantages are: (i) the availability of well
studied and optimised reasoners (like Fact++, Pellet, Racer Pro, HermiT) for deducing
knowledge or for checking the consistency of certain set of norms; (ii) the possibility to use
tools for ontology editing (like Protégé) and library for automatic ontology management (like
OWL-API or JENA).
Given that OWL 2 DL is mainly a language for expressing knowledge bases it may not
be expressive enough for implementing running dynamic interaction systems, therefore a
further crucial challenge is to study how to effectively and efficiently combine OWL 2 DL
ontologies with rule languages—like Datalog, SWRL (Semantic Web Rule Language), or RIF
(Rule Interchange Format) that is a W3C Recommendation from 22 June 2010—and with
programming languages—like Java—for representing the dynamic evolution of the state of
the system and for monitoring and enforcing the norms. Some preliminary studies on how to
use Semantic Web Languages for realising open systems are presented in [28, 26].
The approach of defining different artificial institutions and then to combine them to
realise different concrete open system is one of the possible approach that tries to tackle the
problem of re-usability of artificial institutions. An open and crucial challenge is to study the
process of transforming a conceptual model of an artificial institutions in a concrete running
software where the interaction among autonomous agents can actually take place.
Concerning the challenge of situating open systems in agent environments a possible
approach could be the introduction of a formal description of spaces of interaction and
objects as first-class entities that shape the environment and describe all its structural
components, including norms. A crucial challenge in this approach is managing AI and
spaces interdependencies in terms of events and norms that regulate those events. Initial
studies in this direction are presented in [73, 29].
10.4 Lopes Cardoso: Achieving Open Normative Environments
Most approaches to modelling normative multi-agent systems are based on statically defined
normative scenarios. Even when assuming an open stance in terms of the nature of interacting
agents (which are seen as heterogeneous self-interested entities that cannot be assumed to
be benevolent), such approaches do not accommodate a normative-level autonomy [79] of
interacting agents. As such, when entering the system agents adhere to the normative
scenario that has been predefined. This is the approach we see in organization-oriented
models (such as [18]) or in dialogical electronic institutions [54].
Looking at open normative environments from an extended perspective, norm-autonomous
agents should be able to choose the norms they wish to govern their relationships. Therefore,
it is not only the origin or benevolence of agents that is not certain (which is a must in
open multi-agent systems), but more importantly the norms that are to be handled by
the environment cannot be totally predicted in advance. It is thus important to think
of the normative environment as providing infrastructures for fulfilling two distinct and
complementary roles:
Normative setup. How can agents be assisted in their effort to specify the norms that
better fit their intended interaction scenario?
Norm monitoring and enforcement. What kinds of mechanisms can the environment
employ with the aim of monitoring and enforcing norm-regulated relationships?
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While the latter has been widely addressed by several researchers working both on monitoring
(e.g., [51, 48]) and enforcement (e.g., [57, 24, 37, 49]), the issue of runtime normative setup has
been mostly neglected—as mentioned before, designed normative environments are typically
closed as far as the normative space is concerned. Nevertheless, this issue is important in
application domains configuring regulated coalition settings, such as agent-based electronic
contracting or Virtual Enterprise formation.
10.4.1 Environment Design and Normative Evolution
The study of the environment as a first-class entity in multi-agent systems (MAS) is quite
recent [81]. A role that the environment may fulfil is that of normative state maintenance, by
employing appropriate norm monitoring policies. This has been identified as a viable altern-
ative to deploying “institutional agents” responsible for this task: the governing responsibility
is transferred to the environment itself [61]. Typically, a rule-based infrastructure that defines
reactions to events is the approach taken to realise this kind of environment, allowing not
only to regulate agent interaction but any action that is taken within the environment.
Along this line, coordination artefacts [56] have been proposed as abstractions encap-
sulating and providing a coordination service that agents can exploit in a social context.
Coordination artifacts aim at enabling the creation/composition of social activities and at
ruling those activities, from a normative perspective. Several proposals have been made to
conceive artefacts of several types. This includes the use of organizational mechanisms to
address the normative aspects of a MAS [40], mostly from a normative state monitoring
perspective.
The structuring of a normative environment into different social contexts has been
targeted by a number of researchers. Institutional spaces [72] are an approach to segment
the environment into different institutions; these benefit from a common environment
infrastructure in terms of perception and evolution models. Institutions can also be empowered
to govern other institutions [16]. A slightly different perspective is to consider an institutional
environment as being composed of several normative contexts [47] governing different but
sometimes interdependent social relationships. A hierarchical organisation of contexts (or
institutions, for that matter) allows designing the environment with norm inheritance models
in place.
A few researchers have tackled the problem of changing the norms of the environment
at runtime. Theoretical approaches assign to constitutive norms the role of defining the
possible changes to the normative system [3]. More practically-oriented efforts consider
defining appropriate constructs that allow the system designer to define at compile time a
normative transition function that specifies the possible norm changes and the conditions for
their realisation [7, 74]. Letting the agents choose at runtime the changes to introduce in a
normative system (defined in terms of a dynamic protocol) specified at design-time has also
been suggested in [1]. Again, the possible options are application-specific: a set of possible
values for specific fluents are the degrees of freedom agents have when proposing protocol
modifications.
10.4.2 Challenges and Perspectives
The notion of an open normative environment tries to look at the environment from outside
any preexisting organisation, putting the emphasis instead on infrastructural components
that allow normative interactions to take place. By normative interactions we mean not only
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interactions governed by norms, but also norms that are established by a deliberative process
based on interaction.
Given the current approaches to address normative environments (whether disguised
as artificial/electronic institutions or referred to as environments in their own right), the
openness of multi-agent systems is not fully addressed. We argue in favor of the need to
develop appropriate infrastructures for enabling runtime creation of normative specifications.
Although, as mentioned above, there are some approaches in the literature that deal in some
limited way with dynamic adaptation of norms, this issue has not yet been addressed from a
domain-independent perspective.
Having software agents that are able to deliberatively establish on their own some
normative specification of a norm-regulated relationship is a challenging task. Although
there are several relevant research contributions regarding normative reasoning (mostly from
a norm compliance perspective), the specification of appropriate infrastructural components
facilitating normative setup is lacking.
Approaches such as coordination artifacts have been exploited as mediated interaction
mechanisms. A similar mechanism may be explored for assisting the setup of normative
relationships. The use of normative frameworks is another promising approach to ease this
task. Norm inheritance or adaptation mechanisms can be explored. To this end, insights
from legal theory are certainly pertinent sources of inspiration to develop environments that
include such facilities.
10.5 Singh: A Normative Basis for Trust
Open settings, where norms apply, inevitable bring out the problem of decision-making: How
can each party decide on how it should engage the others? Trust is a key ingredient in such
decision making, leading us to another question: How can each party determine how much
trust to place in another autonomous party? To be an effective basis for decision making,
the estimation of trust must incorporate (1) the interaction—task or transaction—being
considered by the decision maker, (2) the social or organisational relationships, and (3) the
relevant context.
The following are the main approaches to trust today.
Today’s distributed computing approaches hard-code some patently naïve assumptions, e.g.,
about the effectiveness of certificate chains [8]. Thus, they provide little or no rational
basis for decision making in realistic settings.
Today’s analytics-based approaches seek to estimate the trustworthiness of a party based on
an analysis of its attributes, behaviour, and relationships [30, 44, 80]. However, existing
approaches largely hide the deep structure that one would informally associate with trust
in natural human and organisational settings. In particular, these approaches provide
simple calculi that associate numeric measures or qualitative descriptions of trust that
seek to summarise the trustworthiness of a party as a single real number or nominal value.
Today’s cognitive approaches build ontologies and knowledge models of contexts and situ-
ations but in a way that gets into the particulars of a domain of application. Further, they
provide complex definitions seeking to formalise how humans subjectively understand
trust, but such definitions call upon concepts for which we cannot easily obtain any data
to use as a basis for prediction or analysis [11, 10]. Thus, although the cognitive themes
and domain models are useful, such approaches are not easy to apply computationally.
I propose a research direction that seeks to address the above gap in the modelling of
trust in a manner that exploits the inherently normative nature of multi-agent systems to
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address how we can analyse and engender trust. If our collective research efforts succeed, our
main contribution will be a principled approach to trust that provides rich abstractions for
modelling tasks and social or organisational relationships that apply in distributed systems
and can be grounded in analytics-based decision making.
10.5.1 Norms for Trust
The foremost idea underlying trust is that the extent to which one party, Alice, may justifiably
trust another party, Bob, depends on how Alice and Bob interact, including what Alice
observes regarding Bob. I begin from two key points about trust.
Autonomy. Trust carries a connotation of choice: trust is meaningful only when the trusting
party or truster can choose to proceed or not with the given interaction (with its
counterparty, the trustee). And, the trustee can choose whether to carry out the interaction
in question with the requisite quality. The latter element is diminished in cases of
instrumental trust, wherein the truster treats the trustee as an instrument—as part of
the infrastructure—and thus lacking in autonomy. In such cases, the question of trust
reduces to the truster’s trust in the reliability of the trustee.
Exposure. Trust carries a connotation of vulnerability: it is meaningful only when the
trusting party has some skin in the game. If we were to somehow guarantee full protection
to the trusting party, it could decide independently of its trust in any counterparty.
Given the foregoing points, I preserve the basic intuition that Alice’s trust in Bob is
strengthened when Bob meets or exceeds her expectations and weakened otherwise. Alice
could observe Bob from a distance, as he interacts with others, but her learning of him would
be the most relevant in circumstances where Alice personally faces a certain vulnerability to
Bob’s potential malice (or, in the case of an instrument, incompetence)—that is, when Alice
has placed trust in Bob.
In departure from traditional research on trust, I express the relevant expectations
formally in terms of normative relationships between Alice, Bob, and the other parties in
the given system. From efforts in modelling large-scale systems from the standpoints of
contractual relationships and decentralised administration, I have identified a small set of
norm types [69]. Specifically, is Bob authorised to do something, committed to doing it, or
prohibited from doing it? To what extent are Alice and Bob encounters regimented (so as to
prevent violation) by their environment? To what extent is Alice directly protected? To what
extent is Alice indirectly protected: would Bob be sanctioned (punished) for a violation?
The lower the regimentation or protection the greater is Alice’s vulnerability. Based on these,
we can analyse Bob’s actions from Alice’s viewpoint—and Alice’s actions from Bob’s. Thus
for each party we can provide a basis for determining how much trust to place in the other.
The norms I propose can all be expressed in conditional logic, e.g., [67]. Their logical basis
offers a clear way to assign semantics to trust based on sets of possible computation paths
[68]. We can use the semantics as a standard of correctness for any formal trust calculus,
including as a basis for analytics. For example, Alice ought to trust Bob to no greater an
extent for keeping his commitment to do P and Q than for keeping his commitment to do
P alone. Such semantics can provide a basis for a rich variety of trust calculi that may be
specialised for particular kinds of distributed software systems. Thus, if Alice determines
(for example, via data mining) that Bob is trustworthy (to a specific extent) for P and Q,
she should infer that Bob is at least as trustworthy for P . A potential practical benefit of
the proposed approach is dealing with heterogeneous observations from which trust needs
to be determined in the field. Such observations often do not respect simple patterns (such
as being clear-cut positive or negative about the same P ) from which one can compute a
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probability. I conjecture that a normative approach can provide a basis for extracting the
most information from the observations that arise in practice.
Initially, we might pursue a Bayesian approach, which relates well both to analytics and
to a semantics based on computation paths. In subsequent studies, it would be worthwhile
to consider richer representations such as those based on utility theory.
Any approach to trust can be difficult to evaluate, and especially so if we bring in
sophisticated concepts such as norms. Existing public datasets, e.g., for social networks, are
limited and do not specify interactions. Indeed, the limited nature of available datasets is
one of the important reasons for the popularity of the simplistic analytics-based approaches
to trust. The following are two potential evaluation approaches.
Obtain a text-rich dataset of user comments on each other and carry out text mining
to infer assessments of the implicit norms involved and the felicity of the interactions
involved.
Develop a new dataset based on one or more games that we can have users play against
each other. Such a dataset would likely be small but would point the way toward richer
modelling.
10.5.2 A Call to Arms
To summarise, we see today a significant gap between trust theory and practice. Analytical
and distributed systems approaches to trust involve shallow models not representative of real
applications; even when these approaches talk of social networks, they do so in a manner
that disregards any meaningful characterisation of the underlying social relationships. The
cognitive models are richer but incomplete, yet difficult to characterise empirically from
practically obtainable data.
The proposed norm-based research program will contribute a principled approach to trust
that provides includes semantically rich abstractions for tasks and social or organisational
relationships, yet which can be grounded in analytics-based decision making. This program is
ambitious: it doesn’t seek incremental improvements to current approaches, but to introduce
a sea change in how trust is approached in research and practice, beginning from a foundation
in norms.
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